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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/appellee, : 
Case No. 960388-CA 
V. : 
ROBERT WELLS THOMPSON, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Based on a conditional guilty plea, defendant was convicted 
of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (1994 & Supp. 1995), a third 
degree felony, and possession of methamphetamine in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1994 & Supp. 1995), a third 
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Under Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), may 
police conduct a pat-down search of the companion to a lawful 
arrestee if police reasonably believe that the companion may be 
armed or pose a risk to the safety of the police or others? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's factual findings underlying its decision to 
deny a motion to suppress are reviewed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1992). 
Factual findings are clearly erroneous only if the trial court's 
factual findings are not adequately supported by the record, 
"resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the trial court's determination." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). A trial court's legal conclusions based 
on its factual findings, are reviewed for correctness, being 
afforded no deference. Pena, 869 P.2d at 939; Brown, 853 P.2d at 
855. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-16(1995) 
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily 
for questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon 
if he reasonably believes he or any other person is in 
danger. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Robert Thompson, was charged in an information 
with possession of marijuana, a controlled substance, with intent 
to distribute in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (1994 & Supp. 
1995); possession of methamphetamine, a controlled substance, in 
a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1994 & Supp. 1995); and unlawful 
possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(2) (1994) 
(R. 9) • 
Defendant moved to suppress all evidence discovered from a 
pre-arrest search of defendant's person (R. 21). At a hearing on 
defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court heard testimony 
from the two police officers who arrested defendant (R. 78-155). 
The trial court made a specific finding that the officer 
conducted a pat-down search of defendant because the officer was 
concerned for his safety (R. 44)• The trial court then concluded 
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that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that defendant might 
pose a threat to their safety, that the pat-down search was 
justified under the requirements of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 
S. Ct. 1868 (1968) and State v. White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 
1993), and that the search was further justified by the officers' 
need to secure the arrest scene for officer safety while 
arresting his companion, Timothy Lamoreaux (R. 44-45) . 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court denied defendant's 
motion to suppress. The trial court issued specific findings of 
fact and conclusions of law as required by rule 12 (c), Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure (R. 43-45). 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, and to preserve the 
suppression issue for appeal, defendant entered a conditional 
guilty plea to a reduced charge of possession of marijuana, a 
controlled substance, with intent to distribute, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (1994 & 
Supp. 1995), and possession of methamphetamine, a controlled 
substance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, 
§ 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (R. 49-56, 157-170).1 The 
*The minute entry for the change of plea hearing erroneously 
states that the defendant changed his plea to "not guilty." (R. 
58). This is clearly a clerical error in view of the transcript 
of the plea colloquy in which defendant unequivocally pleads 
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trial court dismissed the charge of unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone (R. 49-56, 157-170). 
Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent indeterminate 
terms not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 62-
63). The execution of the sentence was suspended and defendant 
was placed on probation (R. 63). Defendant filed a timely appeal 
from the trial court's judgment (R. 72). 
STATEMENT OF PACTS 
On December 17, 1995, at approximately 8:15 p.m., Officers 
Bud Walker and Dray Savage of the Provo City Police Department 
arrived in an unmarked car at the trailer home of Timothy A. 
Lamoreaux to serve Lamoreaux with a no-bail felony arrest warrant 
for the distribution of illegal drugs (R. 84, 86). The officers 
had a Xerox copy of a photograph of Lamoreaux to help identify 
him (R. 84). 
Upon reaching Lamoreaux's residence, the officers approached 
the trailer on foot (R. 85). Officer Savage could see Lamoreaux 
with another man through a lit window in the trailer (R. 85, 109-
110). Officer Walker walked up the sidewalk leading to the front 
guilty to the two charges (R. 166-67) and in view of the 
Conditional Plea Agreement and Certification prepared by 
defendant's counsel (R. 59-61). 
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door while Officer Savage moved along the side of the trailer 
toward the rear door to prevent Lamoreaux from escaping through 
the back door (R. 85, 110-111). 
The front door opened as Officer Walker approached, and 
Lamoreaux exited the trailer with defendant (R. 86). Officer 
Walker immediately stepped behind a tree to avoid detection (R. 
86-87). Officer Walker moved out and confronted Lamoreaux when 
Lamoreaux and defendant were only a few feet away (R. 87). 
Officer Walker told Lamoreaux that he was under arrest and began 
to place handcuffs on him (R. 87-88). Defendant immediately put 
his hands down to his sides, placing at least one of them into 
his pocket (R. 88-89). Defendant appeared to be unnaturally 
tense and he attempted to move out of the police officer's view 
(R. 89). As Officer Walker talked to Lamoreaux, he tried to keep 
an eye on defendant because he was concerned for his safety (R. 
89-91). Lamoreaux asked Officer Walker if defendant could take 
some personal property on Lamoreaux's person to Lamoreaux's 
parents (R. 88). Officer Walker ordered defendant to remain 
nearby (R. 44) . 
While Officer Walker was speaking with Lamoreaux, defendant 
moved into the shadows toward the rear of the trailer where he 
encountered Officer Savage (R. 44, 91, 112-13). Initially, 
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because of the darkness, Officer Savage could not identify 
defendant (R. 112). However, as defendant came closer, the light 
from Officer Savage's flashlight enabled the officer to identify 
defendant as the man he had seen earlier with Lamoreaux through 
the lit window (R. 113). Officer Savage did not know that 
Officer Walker had contacted Lamoreaux and defendant, nor did he 
know why defendant had come around to the back (R. 113). Officer 
Savage believed that defendant might have come to the back 
because he wanted to re-enter the trailer from the rear to help 
Lamoreaux escape (R. 113). Officer Savage watched defendant 
return to Officer Walker's location in the front (R. 114). 
Officer Savage joined defendant in the front after walking around 
the back of the trailer and up the other side (R. 113-114). 
Officer Savage apparently went around because his equipment 
prevented him from squeezing through the narrow space that 
defendant had traveled through (R. 111-114). 
After returning to the front, Officer Savage asked defendant 
for identification, which he provided (R. 114-15). Officer 
Savage then checked to see if defendant had any outstanding 
warrants (R. 115). Defendant continued to keep one hand in his 
pocket and to act evasive and nervous throughout his encounter 
with Officers Walker and Savage (R. 115). Officer Savage asked 
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defendant if he could pat him down for weapons (R. 116). 
Defendant replied, uNo" (R. 116). Officer Savage did not search 
defendant, but watched him while Officer Walker finished 
arresting Lamoreaux (R. 116). 
Once Lamoreaux was secure, Officer Walker asked defendant if 
he had any weapons on him or anything that would hurt Officer 
Walker (R. 93, 105). Defendant did not respond (R. 93) . Officer 
Walker repeated the question and defendant again failed to 
respond (R. 93, 105-106). Officer Walker walked over and touched 
defendant on the shoulder and repeated the question for the third 
time (R. 93) . Defendant started to pull away and stated, "Yes" 
(R. 93). Officer Walker grabbed defendant by the arm and 
positioned him up against the car and instructed him to place his 
hands where the officer could see them (R. 94). Officer Walker 
then patted defendant down for weapons (R. 94). 
While patting defendant down, Officer Walker felt a metallic 
object in one of defendant's jacket pockets which proved to be a 
scale (R. 94). Officer Walker also felt and observed a large, 
plastic baggie containing a green leafy substance, which 
protruded from the pocket by about an inch (R. 94). Officer 
Walker did not remove these items from defendant's pocket, but 
continued to pat him down to search for weapons, which according 
8 
to the officer's testimony would be anything larger than the 
scale previously felt (R. 95-96) . During the pat-down search, 
Officer Walker again asked defendant if he had anything on him 
that was going to hurt the officer (R. 94-95). Defendant 
replied, "Yes, I have syringes" (R. 95). Officer Walker then 
asked defendant, "Are there drugs? Are they with meth or coke?" 
(R. 95)• Defendant answered that the syringes had had 
methamphetamine in them (R. 95). 
Officer Walker placed defendant under arrest for the 
marijuana that Officer Walker discovered during the pat down and 
because of defendant's admission about the syringes (R. 96). 
Because Officer Walker was concerned about being pricked by the 
reported syringes, Officer Walker did not immediately retrieve 
the discovered items, but he removed defendant's coat and placed 
him in handcuffs (R. 96)• 
One week prior to this incident, Officer Walker had been 
involved in another drug-related arrest in which semi-automatic 
weapons were seized (R. 89-90). Both officers testified that in 
their experience drugs and guns were commonly seized together (R. 
44, 89-90, 117). 
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SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
Police may conduct a pat-down search of the companion of a 
lawful arrestee, even though there is no reason to believe that 
the companion is involved in criminal activity, so long as the 
officer can point to specific, articulable facts that lead the 
officer to reasonably believe that the companion may be armed and 
dangerous. Whether an officer's belief is reasonable depends on 
an objective standard, viewed under the totality of the 
circumstances. Officers in this case had a reasonable belief, 
under the totality of the circumstances that defendant may be 
armed and pose a threat to the officer's safety. The need to 
contain the arrest scene for a narcotics violation to protect 
police officers is one factor of many to be considered when 
determining whether the officers' actions were reasonable. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Defendant does not challenge the trial court's factual 
findings, but attacks the trial court's conclusions that Officer 
Walker's pat down frisk of defendant was justified under Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), and State v. White. 856 
P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993), and that the officers were further 
justified in the pat down frisk because of their need to secure 
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the arrest scene, which included the yard area in which the 
defendant was detained (R. 44). The State will address each 
issue in order. 
POINT I 
THE OFFICER'S PAT-DOWN SEARCH OF DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIED 
UNDER TERRY V. OHIO BECAUSE UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES THE OFFICERS HAD A REASONABLE BASIS FOR 
BELIEVING THAT DEFENDANT POSED A RISK TO THEIR SAFETY 
In Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), the 
United States Supreme Court held that a police officer need not 
have probable cause to stop and frisk a person when the officer 
"observes unusual conduct" which leads the officer to reasonably 
conclude that "in light of his experience" the person stopped is 
involved in criminal activity and "may be armed and presently 
dangerous." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884.2 Terry 
established a two-step inquiry when evaluating a warrantless 
protective seizure: 1) was "the officer's action justified at its 
inception," and 2) was the officer's action "reasonably related 
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in 
2Utah has codified the Terry holding at Utah Code Ann. §77-
7-16, which states: "A peace officer who has stopped a person 
temporarily for questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous 
weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other person is in 
danger." However, actions taken under this code provision are 
subject to the requirements set forth in Terry. State v. Roybal. 
716 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986). 
IX 
the first place." Terry. 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879. In 
other words, there must be a reasonable basis for both the stop 
and the frisk for the search to be valid. Id.: State v. Carter. 
707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985). 
Defendant essentially argues that the officers' action in 
stopping defendant was "not justified at its inception" because 
the officers had no reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity by the defendant that would allow them to lawfully 
detain him (Brief of Appellee [Br.App.] at 9). In support of his 
contention, defendant points to Officer Savage's testimony below 
that he suspected no "criminal activity on the part of defendant" 
(R. 123)(Br.App. at 9). Defendant asserts that for the detention 
and subsequent search of defendant to be justified, the facts of 
this case must fall within an exception of the exclusionary rule 
(id.). Defendant acknowledges that a frisk for weapons under the 
requirements of Terry is such an exception to the exclusionary 
rule (id. at 11), but asserts that the officers in this case did 
not actually fear for their safety as demonstrated by their 
actions. 
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A. A police officer may conduct a pat-down search of the 
companion of an arrestee even though the officer does not 
suspect the companion of criminal activity, if the officer 
reasonably believe? that the cpmpgmiQp m^y be armefl QX ppse 
a yigk tQ the safety of the officer QT others. 
While as a general rule it is true that an officer may not 
lawfully detain a person absent probable cause or a reasonable 
suspicion that the person stopped is involved in criminal 
activity, Terry. 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884, a slightly 
different rule attains in cases where the officer is lawfully 
arresting a companion to that person. See United States v. 
Flett. 806 F.2d 823, 826-27 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Menard. 95 F.3d 9, 11 (8th Cir. 1996); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 9.5(a), at 261-64 (1996). Although the United 
States Supreme Court and the appellate courts of Utah have not 
directly addressed the applicability of Terry to the search of a 
companion of an arrestee, several federal circuit courts and the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals have. As a general rule, 
those courts have held that under Terry, a search of a companion 
of an arrestee is proper when under the totality of the 
circumstances, the officer could point to specific, articulable 
facts that led the officer to reasonably conclude that the 
companion might be armed or pose a risk to the safety of the 
officer or others. United States v. Menard. 95 F.3d 9, 10-11 
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(8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Whitfield. 907 F.2d 798, 799 
(8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Flett. 806 F.2d 823, 826-27 
(8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bell. 762 F.2d 495, 498-99 (6th 
Cir.), cert, denied. 474 U.S. 853, 106 S. Ct. 155 (1985); United 
States v. Tharpe. 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976)(en banc), 
overruled in part on other grounds by United States v, Causey/ 
834 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc); United States v. 
Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971); Lewis v. United 
States. 399 A.2d 559, 561 (D.C. 1979) . These courts have not 
required that the officer have a separate articulable suspicion 
of criminal activity by the companion of the arrestee before 
being able to detain and search the companion. See Flett. 806 
F.2d at 828 (upheld frisk of friend present in arrestee's home, 
even though no indication that friend was involved in criminal 
activity); Bell, 762 F.2d at 501 (upheld frisk of companion of 
arrestee even though no evidence that companion was involved in 
criminal activity); Berryhill. 445 F.2d at 1193 (upheld search of 
wife's purse for weapons even though wife not suspected of 
criminal activity); Jones v. United States. 544 A. 2d 1250, 1251 
(D.C. 1988)(protective frisk of passenger upheld in absence of 
suspicion of criminal activity by passenger); see also LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 9.5(a), at 263-64 (even if companion not 
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under sufficient suspicion to be legitimately seized, 
circumstances may still indicate officer should take appropriate 
precautions for safety). 
Thus, in these types of cases, the court's initial inquiry 
is not whether the companion is suspected of criminal activity, 
but "whether the officer was rightfully in the presence of the 
party frisked so as to be endangered if that person was armed, 
and whether the officer had a sufficient degree of suspicion that 
the party to be frisked was armed and dangerous," Flett, 806 
F.2d at 828 (quoting United Stfrte? v, Cl^y, 640 F.2d 157, 159 
(8th Cir. 1981)). Therefore, if the police officer has 
legitimately stopped the arrestee, the only issue is whether the 
officer reasonably believed under the standards set forth by 
Terry that the arrestee's companion posed a risk to the safety of 
the officer or others. 
In this case, defendant does not dispute that Officer Walker 
and Savage had a valid warrant for Lamoreaux and that they were 
justified in going to the home of Lamoreaux to serve that 
warrant. Because defendant was with Lamoreaux when the arrest 
warrant was served, the officers were "rightfully" in the 
presence of defendant "so as to be endangered" if defendant was 
armed. Flett. 806 F.2d at 828; Clay. 640 F.2d at 159. 
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B. Under the objective standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 
the officer reasonably believed that defendant might be 
armed and dangerous. 
Defendant argues that the pat-down search of defendant was 
not justified because although "the officers both testified 
repeatedly that the reason for the detention and the frisk of 
defendant was because they were concerned for their safety, their 
actions demonstrate otherwise" (Br.App. at 12). Defendant 
asserts that the officers were not actually concerned for their 
safety as required by Terry, and points to the officers' delay in 
conducting the pat-down search (Br.App. at 12). Defendant 
finally asserts that by the time Officer Walker searched 
defendant, "any possible concern for officer safety had 
dissipated by a lack of suspicious activity by Thompson, who 
simply wanted to leave the scene" (Br.App. at 13). 
Terry held that the reasonableness of a pat-down search must 
be judged by an objective standard, i.e., "whether a reasonably 
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief 
that his safety or that of others was in danger." State v. 
Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985)(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 
27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883). Under this objective standard, contrary 
to defendant's argument, it does not matter that the officer was 
not in actual fear at the time of the search. State v. Roybal. 
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716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986); Carter, 707 P.2d at 659; Tharpe, 
536 F.2d at 1101. Nor does the officer need to be absolutely 
certain that the individual is armed. Roybal. 716 P.2d at 293; 
Carter. 707 P.2d at 659. The officer need only be able to 
articulate specific facts, which when viewed with rational 
inferences from those facts justify the officer's belief that the 
individual posed a risk to the safety of the officer or others. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880; Carter. 707 P.2d at 
659; State v. White. 856 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah App. 1993); State v. 
Rochell. 850 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah App. 1993); Flett. 806 F.2d at 
826-27. Finally/ in weighing the objective facts before it, the 
court must give due weight to the officer's experience. Terry. 
392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883; Rochell. 850 P.2d at 483; 
State v. Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 88-89; Flett. 806 F.2d at 827. 
There are a variety of factors that courts have considered 
in determining the overall reasonableness of an officer's actions 
in conducting a pat-down search. No one factor controls, but the 
facts must be viewed in their totality. Carter. 707 P.2d at 659. 
Some of the factors that have been considered by courts to 
support an officer's reasonable belief include the failure to 
obey an officer's reasonable command, Bell. 762 F.2d at 501 
(companion of arrestee refused to put hands on dashboard or exit 
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car as commanded); hesitation in answering an officer's question 
of M o you have a weapon," Rochell. 850 P.2d at 483; the darkness 
of the area of the arrest scene, Menard, 95 F.3d at 11-12 
(protective search made on lonely road, late at night); Tharpe. 
536 F.2d at 1100 (officer was alone late at night in poorly lit 
area); furtive or sudden movements, State v. Strickling. 844 P.2d 
979, 984 (Utah App. 1979) (occupants of car reached under seat); 
nervousness exhibited by the persons lawfully detained, Lewis v. 
United States, 399 A.2d 559, 561 (D. C. 1979)(companion of man 
carrying gun wrapped in sweater appeared nervous when questioned 
by police); large bulge in pocket, Carter. 707 P.2d at 660; 
Rochell. 850 P.2d at 483; accompanying an arrestee for narcotics 
violation or known drug dealer, Menard, 95 F.3d at 11; Bell, 762 
F.2d at 500-01; Flett. 806 F.2d at 827; United States v. Del 
Toro, 464 F.2d 520, 521 (2nd Cir. 1972). 
Defendant's argument that the officers' actions did not 
support their testimony that they were concerned for officer 
safety contradicts the specific finding of the trial court that 
Officer Walker frisked defendant u [b]ecause Officer Walker was 
concerned for his safety" (R. 44). Defendant has not challenged 
the trial court's factual findings on appeal, but has only 
attacked two of the court's conclusions made based on the facts 
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before it (Br.App. at 2, 7). In any event, Terry does not 
require that the officer feel fear before a pat-down search is 
justified. Roybal. 716 P.2d at 293; Carter, 707 P.2d at 659; 
Tharpe. 536 F.2d at 1101. As explained, Terry established 
objective criteria as the standard, not the subjective fear of 
the officer. "Evidence that the officer was aware of sufficient 
specific facts as would suggest he was in danger satisfies the 
constitutional requirement." Tharpe. 536 F.2d at 1101. 
Looking at the totality of the circumstances that existed at 
the time of defendant's detention and search, the trial court had 
sufficient evidence to find and to correctly conclude that both 
officers had an objective, reasonable basis to believe, in light 
of their experience, that defendant might be armed and that he 
posed a risk to their safety. The trial court found that both 
officers testified that in their experience drugs and guns were 
commonly seized together (R. 44, 90, 117). Officer Walker 
testified that one week prior to defendant's arrest, he had been 
involved in a drug-related arrest in which semi-automatic weapons 
were seized (R. 44, 89-90). See Bell. 762 F.2d at 500 (officer 
testified that in his general experience narcotics transactions 
frequently involved weapons); Del Toro, 464 F.2d at 521 (officer 
testified that based on 15 years police experience and 7 years 
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experience in narcotics enforcement, drug dealers were usually 
armed and often accompanied by armed body guards); Flett. 8 06 
F.2d at 827 .(officer with 18 years experience testified that drug 
cases were treated differently from other cases). Thus, in going 
to serve an arrest warrant for felony distribution of illegal 
drugs, the officers could reasonably believe, as the trial court 
concluded, that Lamoreaux and any of his companions could 
possibly be armed. 
In addition, upon being contacted by Officer Walker, 
defendant's hand immediately went into his pocket where it stayed 
throughout his contact with the officers (R. 88, 115). Defendant 
moved into the shadows where it was difficult to see him towards 
the rear of the trailer despite Officer Walker's command to 
remain nearby (R. 44). Defendant did not immediately respond 
when asked by Officer Walker if he had any weapons or anything 
that would hurt the officer, and when he did respond he said, 
"yes" (R. 93-94, 105-06). See Rochell. 850 P.2d at 483 (court 
upheld frisk of defendant on totality of circumstances, including 
defendant's hesitation in answering "no" when officer asked if he 
had any weapons)• Taken together, in light of the officers' 
experience, these facts support the trial court's conclusion that 
there was a reasonable basis for the officer's belief that 
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defendant might be armed and dangerous. 
Defendant has suggested that the search was not justified 
because the officers' delay in frisking defendant dissipated any 
possible concern for officer safety that they might have had 
because of a lack of suspicious activity by defendant, "who 
simply wanted to leave the scene" (Br.App. at 13). The fact that 
the officers did not immediately search defendant does not negate 
the other facts occurring after the initial contact that support 
the trial court's conclusion that officers had reasonable belief 
that defendant might be armed. See Menard. 95 F.3d at 11 
(officer's delay in frisking defendant did not confirm that there 
was no particularized suspicion to frisk). Terry held that an 
officer who lawfully detains a person to investigate criminal 
activity and who reasonably believes that the person detained may 
be armed and dangerous, and 
where in the course of investigating this behavior he 
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable 
inquiries and where nothing in the initial stages of the 
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own 
or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of 
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully 
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an 
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault 
him. 
Terry. 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884-85 (emphasis added). 
Defendant's conduct from the moment of his initial contact with 
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Officer Walker until the frisk did nothing to dispel Officers 
Walkers' and Savages' reasonable apprehension that defendant 
might be armed. In fact, defendant's conduct escalated from 
putting his hand in his pocket, to walking to the rear of the 
trailer as if to re-enter the trailer, to not immediately 
responding and then saying "yes" when asked if he was armed or 
had anything that would hurt the officer. The progressive events 
in this case heightened any initial fear that the officers may or 
may not have had until they reasonably believed that defendant 
posed a risk to them. Contrary to defendant's assertion, there 
is nothing in the record that supports the statement that 
defendant "simply wanted to leave the scene" or that he conveyed 
that desire to the officers (Br.App. at 13). 
Because the totality of the circumstances support the 
officers' reasonable belief that defendant might be armed and 
dangerous, the trial court correctly concluded that Officer 
Walker was justified under Terry in conducting a pat-down search 
of defendant. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE OFFICERS WERE 
JUSTIFIED IN SECURING THE ARREST SCENE FOR OFFICER SAFETY 
AND THEREFORE WERE JUSTIFIED IN FRISKING DEFENDANT IS ONE 
FACTOR OF MANY TO BE CONSIDERED. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in concluding 
that ubecause the officers were effecting a valid arrest of 
Lamoreaux, they were justified in securing the arrest scene, 
which included the yard area in which Defendant was detained. In 
securing the scene for officer safety, the pat down frisk was 
further justified" (R. 44) . 
To the extent that the trial court was stating a blanket 
rule that police officers may frisk all persons who happen to be 
in proximity to an arrestee, defendant's argument is correct 
under Yfrflyra vT Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979), 
reh'g <fenie<3, 444 U.S. 1049, lOO S. Ct. 741 (1980) . In Ybarra. 
the United States Supreme Court held that police were not 
justified in searching a bar patron who happened to be present 
when police arrived to execute the search of a bar pursuant to a 
valid search warrant. The Court held that "a person's mere 
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal 
activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to 
search that person." Ybarra. 444 U.S. at 91, 100 S. Ct. at 342 
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(emphasis added). The Court also held that the search of the bar 
patron was not permissible under Terry because the state could 
not articulate any specific facts that would lead the police to 
reasonably believe that the patron was armed and dangerous. 
Ybarra. 444 U.S. at 93, 100 S. Ct. at 343. The implication in 
Ybarra is that if the officers had been able to articulate any 
specific facts that supported a reasonable belief that the 
defendant was armed and presently dangerous, a pat-down frisk 
would have been appropriate. Id. 
The trial court's conclusion, however, may not be as broad 
as defendant asserts. The trial court made specific findings 
pointing to facts that Officer Walker was reasonably concerned 
for his safety. Before making the challenged conclusion, the 
trial court first concluded that the officers' restraint of 
defendant was initially for their safety; that based on the 
warrant for Lamoreaux's arrest and the officers' previous 
experience with drugs and guns, the officers had a reasonable 
suspicion that defendant may pose a threat to their safety; that 
the pat-down search of defendant was conducted for officer 
safety; and that the pat-down search was justified under Terry 
and State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993) (R. 44). The 
trial court then prefaced the conclusion complained of with "Also 
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. . . ." implying that this was merely an additional factor that 
the court considered and weighed in making its decision (R. 44). 
Thus, the trial court's conclusion can reasonably be read to mean 
that the need to secure the arrest scene was only one more factor 
that the trial court considered with all the other relevant 
factors in determining that the officers' actions were 
reasonable. While securing an arrest scene does not give police 
officers a carte Jblanche to search everyone who happens to be 
present at the scene, Ybarra. 444 U.S. at 94-95, 100 S. Ct. at 
343-44, the fact that a narcotics arrest is being made is a 
factor to be considered in conjunction with other factors that 
the officer's safety may be at risk. See e.g., United States v. 
Menard, 95 F.3d 9 (8th Cir. 1996); United StflteS vf Pell, 762 
F.2d 495, 500-01 (6th Cir. 1985); United Stfrteg v. Pel TorP, 464 
F.2d 520, 521 (2nd Cir. 1972); United States v. Flett. 806 F.2d 
823, 827 (8th Cir. 1986). 
Even if the trial court's conclusion is error, there is no 
harm to defendant as the trial court was correct in its 
conclusion that the search of defendant was justified under 
Terry-
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court was justified on the basis of the evidence 
in finding and concluding that the officers' belief that 
defendant might have been armed was reasonable, thereby 
justifying their frisk of him under Terry. Further, the trial 
court's conclusion that the officers were justified in frisking 
defendant because of their need to secure the arrest scene was 
not error because it was only one factor of many that the trial 
court weighed in concluding that the pat-down search of defendant 
was reasonable. 
The trial court's denial of the motion to suppress should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECFULLY SUBMITTED this 5~ day of December, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
LAURA B. DUPAIX 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Appendix A 
IK TEE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, 8TATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT W. THOMPSON, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 961400017 
RULING 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court has reviewed the file, considered 
the memoranda of counsel, and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the 
following: 
RULING 
FINDING OF FACTS 
On December 17, 1995, at approximately 8:15 p.m., Officers Bud Walker and Dray 
Savage went to the home of Timothy Lamoreaux to serve an arrest warrant on him. The 
warrant had been issued for felony distribution of drugs. Officer Walker went to the front 
door of the mobile home in which Lamoreaux lived, while Officer Savage went to the rear to 
cover the back door. As Officer Walker approached the front door, Lamoreaux and 
Defendant exited the home; at that point, Officer Walker informed Lamoreaux of the arrest 
warrant and handcuffed him. 
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Officer Walker ordered Defendant to remain nearby, but Defendant slowly walked 
toward the other side of the home, into the shadows. Officer Savage met Defendant in the 
dark and ordered him to return to the front of the home where Officer Walker and 
Lamoreaux were located. One week prior to the arrest, Officer Walker had been involved in 
a drug-related arrest in which semi-automatic weapons were seized. In addition, the officers 
testified that drugs and guns were commonly seized together. Because Officer Walker was 
concerned for his safety, he conducted a pat-down frisk of Defendant's outer clothing, 
during which time Officer Walker asked Defendant whether anything could harm him as he 
frisked Defendant. Defendant responded that he had syringes in his jacket pocket. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The officers' restraint of Defendant was initially for their safety. Based on the 
warrant for Lamoreaux's arrest and on the officers' previous encounters with drugs and 
guns, the officers had a reasonable suspicion that Defendant may pose a threat to their safety. 
2. Officer Walker's pat down frisk of Defendant was therefore conducted for 
officer safety. 
3. Pursuant to the requirements outlined by Terry v. Ohio. 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968) 
and State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), Officer Walker's pat down frisk 
was justified and therefore valid. 
4. Also, because the officers were effecting a valid arrest of Lamoreaux, they 
were justified in securing the arrest scene, which included the yard area in which Defendant 
was detained. In securing the scene for officer safety, the pat down frisk was further 
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justified. 
5. Pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. 86 S.Ct 1602 (1966) and State v. Streeter. 
900 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), before conducting a custodial interrogation, arresting 
officers must apprise a defendant of several constitutional rights. Officer Walker's pre-
Miranda question was not to interrogate Defendant; rather, he posed the question to insure 
his own personal safety. The question and resulting answer, therefore, did not violate 
Miranda's protections. 
6. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is therefore DENIED. 
Counsel for the State is to prepare an order consistent with the terms of this ruling 
and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court 
for signature. 
Dated this JL day of March, 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: RANDALL K. SPENCER 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
JOHN L. ALLAN 
DEPUTY UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
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